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Abstract: In formal approaches, messages sent over a network are usually modeled by
terms together with an equational theory, axiomatizing the properties of the cryptographic
functions (encryption, exclusive or, ...). The analysis of cryptographic protocols requires
a precise understanding of the attacker knowledge. Two standard notions are usually used:
deducibility and indistinguishability. Those notions are well-studied and a lot of decidability
results already exist to deal with a variety of equational theories.
We show that decidability results can be easily combined for any disjoint equational
theories: if the deducibility and indistinguishability relations are decidable for two disjoint
theories, they are also decidable for their union. As an application, new decidability results
can be obtained using this combination theorem.
Key-words: equational theories, security protocols, deduction, static equivalence, combi-
nation of decision procedures
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y LORIA, CNRS & INRIA project Cassis, Nancy, France. This work has been partly supported by the
RNTL project PROUV E and the RNTL project POSEAlgorithmes de combinaison pour d ecider la d eduction
et l' equivalence statique
R esum e : En m ethodes formelles, les messages sont repr esent es par des termes accom-
pagn es d'une th eorie equationelle permettant de prendre en compte les propri et esalg ebriques
des op erateurs consid er es (chirement, ou exclusif, ...). L'analyse des protocoles de s ecurit e
demande de raisonner sur la connaissance de l'intrus. Deux notions standards sont uti-
lis ees: la d eduction et l'indistinguabilit e. Ces notions ont  et e bien  etudi ees et de nombreux
r esultats de d ecidabilit e existent. Ils permettent de traiter une grande vari et e de th eories
 equationnelles.
Nous montrons que ces r esultats de d ecidabilit e peuvent se combiner d es lors que les
th eories  equationnelles ne partagent pas de symboles: si la d eduction et l'indistinguabilit e
sont d ecidables pour deux th eories disjointes, ces deux notions sont  egalement d ecidables
pour leur union. De nouveaux r esultats peuvent ^ etre ainsi obtenus en utilisant la proc edure
de combinaison propos ee.
Mots-cl es : th eories  equationnelles, protocoles de s ecurit e, d eduction,  equivalence sta-
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1 Introduction
Security protocols are paramount in today's secure transactions through public channels. It
is therefore essential to obtain as much condence as possible in their correctness. Formal
methods have proved their usefulness for precisely analyzing the security of protocols. Un-
derstanding security protocols often requires reasoning about knowledge of the attacker. In
formal approaches, two main kind of denitions have been given in the literature for this
knowledge. They are known as message deducibility and indistinguishability relations.
Most often, the knowledge of the attacker is described in terms of message deducibil-
ity [17, 19, 18]. Given some set of messages  representing the knowledge of the attacker
and another message M, intuitively the secret, one can ask whether an attacker is able
to compute M from . To obtain such a message he uses his deduction capabilities. For
instance, he may encrypt and decrypt using keys that he knows.
This concept of deducibility does not always suce for expressing the knowledge of an
attacker. For example, if we consider a protocol that transmits an encrypted Boolean value,
we may ask whether an attacker can learn this value by eavesdropping the protocol. Of
course, it seems to be completely unrealistic to say that the Boolean true and false are not
deducible. We need to express the fact that the two transcripts of the protocol, one running
with the Boolean value true and the other one with false are indistinguishable. Besides
allowing more careful formalization of secrecy properties, indistinguishability can also be
used for proving the more involved notion of cryptographic indistinguishability [7, 1, 16]:
two sequences of messages are cryptographically indistinguishable if their distributions is
indistinguishable to any attacker, that it to any probabilistic polynomial Turing machine.
In both cases, deduction and indistinguishability apply to observations on messages at
a particular point in time. They do not take into account the dynamic behavior of the
protocol. For this reason the indistinguishability relation is called static equivalence. Never-
theless those relations are quite useful to reason about the dynamic behavior of a protocol.
For instance, the deducibility relation is often used as a subroutine of many decision proce-
dures [20, 8, 12]. In the applied-pi calculus framework [5], it has been shown that observa-
tional equivalence (relation which takes into account the dynamic behavior) coincides with
labeled bisimulation which corresponds to checking static equivalences and some standard
bisimulation conditions.
Both of these relations rely on an underlying equational theory axiomatizing the prop-
erties of the cryptographic functions (encryption, exclusive or, ...). A lot of decision pro-
cedures have been provided to decide these relations under a variety of equational theories.
For instance algorithms for deduction are provided for exclusive or [12], homomorphic oper-
ators [13], Abelian groups with distributive encryption [15] and subterm theories [2]. These
theories allow basic equations for functions such as encryption, decryption and digital sig-
nature. Static equivalence is also well-studied. For instance, a general decidability result
to handle the class of subterm convergent equational theories is given in [2]. In [3] some
abstract conditions on the underlying equational theory are proposed to ensure decidability
of deduction and static equivalence. Note that the use of this result requires checking some
assumptions, which might be dicult to prove. This result has been applied to several in-
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teresting equational theories such as exclusive or, blind signature and other associative and
commutative functions.
For all the previous results, decidability is provided for particular xed theories or for
particular classes of theories. In this paper, we provide a general combination result for both
deduction and static equivalence: if the deducibility and indistinguishability relations are
decidable for two disjoint theories E1 and E2 (that is, the equations of E1 and E2 do not share
any symbol), they are also decidable for their union E1 [ E2. Our algorithm for combining
theories is polynomial (in the DAG-size of the inputs). It ensures in particular that if
the deducibility and indistinguishability relations are decidable for two disjoint theories in
polynomial time, they are decidable in polynomial time for their union.
The interest of our result is twofold: rst, it allows to obtain new decidability results
from any combination of the existing ones: for example, we obtain that static equivalence
is decidable for the theory of encryption combined with exclusive or (and also for example
with blind signature), which was not known before. Second, our result allows a modular
approach. Deciding interesting equational theories that could not be considered before can
be done simply by reducing to the decision of simpler and independent theories.
Our combination result relies on combination algorithms for solving unication prob-
lem modulo an equational theory [21, 6]. It is closed to the result of Chevalier and Rusi-
nowitch [9], who show how to combine decision algorithms for the deducibility problem in
presence of an active attacker. Their result takes into account the dynamic behavior of the
protocol. Although our combination result for deduction is clearly related to their main
result, how deduction can be combined for disjoint equational theories is not stated in their
paper. Moreover they do not deal at all with static equivalence.
Outline of the paper. In Section 2 we introduce notation and denitions as well as the two no-
tions of knowledge. Section 3 provides some material for our combination algorithms. Then
Sections 4 and 5 are devoted to the study of deduction and static equivalence respectively.
In Section 6, we sum up our results and provide new results obtained as a consequence of
our main theorems. Omitted proofs can be found in the appendices.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Basic denitions
A signature  consists of a nite set of function symbols, such as enc and pair, each with an
arity. A function symbol with arity 0 is a constant symbol. Given a signature , an innite
set of names N, and an innite set of variables X, we denote by T () (resp. T (;X)) the
set of terms over  [ N (resp.  [ N [ X). The former is called the set of ground terms
over , while the later is simply called the set of terms over . We write fn(M) (resp.
fv(M)) for the set of names (resp. variables) that occur in the term M. A context C is a
term with holes, or (more formally) a linear term. When C is a context with n distinguished
variables x1;:::;xn, we may write C[x1;:::;xn] instead of C in order to show the variables,
and when T1;:::;Tn are terms we may also write C[T1;:::;Tn] for the result of replacing
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each variable xi with the corresponding term Ti. A substitution  is a mapping from a nite
subset of X called its domain and written dom() to T (;X). Substitutions are extended
to endomorphisms of T (;X) as usual. We use a postx notation for their application.
We equip the signature  with an equational theory E, that is, an equivalence relation on
terms that is closed under application of contexts and under substitutions of terms for both
names and variables. We write M =E N when M and N are terms and the equation M = N
is in E. A theory E is consistent if there does not exist two distinct names n1 and n2 such
that n1 =E n2. Note that, in an inconsistent theory, the problem we are interested in, i.e.
deduction (dened in 2.3) and static equivalence (dened in 2.4) are trivial.
Example 1 Let xor be the signature made up of the constant symbol 0 and the binary
function  and Exor induced by the following set of equations:
x  (y  z) = (x  y)  z x  0 = x
x  y = y  x x  x = 0
We have that a  (b  a) =Exor b.
Denition 1 (syntactic subterm) The set Sts(M) of syntactic subterms of a term M
is dened recursively as follows:
Sts(M) =
8
> <
> :
fMg if M is a variable or a name
fMg [
` [
i=1
Sts(Mi) if M = f(M1;:::;M`)
The positions in a term M are dened recursively as usual (i.e. sequences of integers). We
denote by Mjp the syntactic subterm of M at position p. The term obtained by replacing
Mjp by N is denoted M[N]p.
2.2 Assembling terms into frames
At a particular point in time, while engaging in one or more sessions of one or more protocols,
an attacker may know a sequence of messages M1;:::;M`. This means that he knows each
message but he also knows in which order he obtained the messages. So it is not enough for
us to say that the attacker knows the set of terms fM1;:::;M`g. Furthermore, we should
distinguish those names that the attacker knows from those that were freshly generated by
others and which remain secret from the attacker; both kinds of names may appear in the
terms.
In the applied pi calculus [5], such a sequence of messagesis organizedinto a frame  = ~ n:,
where ~ n is a nite set of names (intuitively the fresh ones), and  is a substitution of the
form:
fM1=x1;:::; M`=x`g with dom() = fx1;:::;x`g
The variables enable us to refer to each Mi and we always assume that the terms Mi are
ground. The free names of , denoted fn(), are those which appear in  and not in ~ n, i.e.
(
S`
i=1 fn(Mi)) r ~ n. The names ~ n are bound and can be renamed. Moreover names that do
not appear in the free names of  can be added or removed from ~ n.
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2.3 Deduction
Given a frame  that represents the information available to an attacker, we may ask whether
a given ground term M may be deduced from . Given an equational theory E on , this
relation is written  ` M and is axiomatized by the following rules:
if 9x 2 dom() s.t. x = M
~ n: ` M
s 62 ~ n
~ n: ` s
 ` M1 :::  ` M`
f 2 
 ` f(M1;:::;M`)
 ` M
M =E M0
 ` M0
Intuitively, the deducible messages are the messages of  and the names that are not pro-
tected in , closed by equality in E and closed by application of function symbols. Note
that that  and M might be built on a signature 0, possibly larger that . Since the
deducible messages depend on the underlying equational theory, we write `E when E is not
clear from the context. When ~ n: ` M, any occurrence of names from ~ n in M is bound
by ~ n. So ~ n: ` M could be formally written ~ n:( ` M). It is easy to prove by induction
the following characterization of deduction.
Lemma 1 (characterization of deduction) Let M be a ground term and ~ n: be a
frame. Then ~ n: `E M if and only if there exists a term  such that fn() \ ~ n = ;
and  =E M. Such a term  is a recipe of the term M.
Example 2 Consider the signature enc = fdec;enc;pair;proj1;proj2g. The symbols dec;enc
and pair are functional symbols of arity 2 that represent respectively the decryption, encryp-
tion and pairing functions whereas proj1 and proj2 are functional symbols of arity 1 that
represent the projection function on respectively the rst and the second component of a
pair. As usual, we may write hx;yi instead of pair(x;y). The equational theory of pairing
and symmetric encryption, denoted by Eenc, is dened by the following equations:
dec(enc(x;y);y) = x, proj1(hx;yi) = x and proj2(hx;yi) = y.
Let  = k;s1:fenc(hs1;s2i;k)=x1; k=x2g. We have  ` k,  ` s1 and  ` s2. Indeed x2,
proj1(dec(x1;x2)) and s2 are recipes of the terms k, s1 and s2 respectively.
We say that the deduction is decidable for the equational theory (;E) if the following
problem is decidable.
Entries A frame  and a term M built on 
Question  `E M ?
2.4 Static equivalence
Deduction does not always suce for expressing the knowledge of an attacker, as discussed
in the introduction. Sometimes, the attacker can deduce exactly the same set of terms from
two dierent frames but he could still be able to tell the dierence between these two frames.
RR n
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Denition 2 (static equivalence) Let  be a frame and M and N be two terms. We say
that M and N are equal in the frame ' under the theory E, and write (M =E N)', if there
exists ~ n such that  = ~ n:, (fn(M) [ fn(N)) \ ~ n = ; and M =E N. We say that two
frames ' = ~ n: and '0 = ~ n:0 are statically equivalent w.r.t. (;E), and write ' E '0
(or shortly '1  '2) when dom(') = dom('0), and
8M;N 2 T (;X) we have that (M =E N)' , (M =E N)'0.
Example 3 Consider the equational theory (enc;Eenc) provided in Example 2. Let ' =
k:, '0 = k:0 where  = fenc(s0;k)=x1; k=x2g, 0 = fenc(s1;k)=x1; k=x2g. Intuitively, s0 and
s1 could be the two possible (public) values of a vote. We have dec(x1;x2) =Eenc s0 whereas
dec(x1;x2)0 6=Eenc s0. Therefore we have ' 6 '0. However, note that k:fenc(s0;k)=x1g  k:fenc(s1;k)=x1g.
Let (;E) be an equational theory. We dene EqE() to be the set of equations satised
by the frame  = ~ n: in the equational theory E:
EqE() = f(M;N) 2 T (;X)
2 j (M =E N)g:
We write   j= EqE() if (M =E N)  for any (M;N) 2 EqE().
Checking for static equivalence is clearly equivalent to checking whether the frames satisfy
each other equalities.
Lemma 2 (characterization of static equivalence) Let 1 = ~ n:1 and 2 = ~ n:2 be
two frames. We have
1 E 2 , 2 j= EqE(1) and 1 j= EqE(2):
We say that the static equivalence is decidable for the equational theory (;E) if the
following problem is decidable.
Entries Two frames 1 and 2 built on 
Question 1 E 2 ?
3 Material for combination algorithms
We consider two equational theories (1;E1) and (2;E2) that are disjoint (1 \ 2 = ;)
and consistent. We denote by  the union of the signatures 1 and 2 and by E the union
of the equations E1 and E2.
3.1 Factors, Subterms
We denote by sign() the function that associates to each term M, the signature (1 or 2)
of its root symbol. For M 2 N [X, we dene sign(M) = ?, where ? is a new symbol. The
term N is alien to M if sign(N) 6= sign(M). We now introduce our notion of subterms. This
notion is also used in [9].
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Denition 3 (factors, subterms) Let M 2 T (;X). The factors of M are the maximal
syntactic subterms of M that are alien to M. This set is denoted Fct(M). The set of its
subterms, denoted St(M), is dened recursively by
St(M) = fMg [
[
N2Fct(M)
St(N)
These notations are extended as expected to sets of terms and frames.
Let M 2 T (;X). The size jMj of a term M is dened jMj = 0 if M is a name or a variable
and by 1 +
Pn
i=1 jNij if M = C[N1;:::;Nn] where C is a context built on 1 (or 2) and
N1;:::Nn are the factors of M.
Example 4 Consider the equational theories Eenc and Exor. Let M be the term dec(hn1 
hn2;n3i;proj1(n1  n2)i;n3). The term n1  hn2;n3i is a syntactic subterm of M alien
to M since sign(n1  hn2;n3i) = xor and sign(M) = enc. We have that Fct(M) =
fn1  hn2;n3i; n1  n2; n3g, St(M) = Fct(M) [ fM; n1; n2; hn2;n3ig and jMj = 4.
3.2 Ordered rewriting
Most of the denitions and results in this subsection are borrowed from [10] since we use
similar techniques. We consider the notion of ordered rewriting dened in [14], which is a
useful tool that has been used (e.g. [6]) for proving correctness of combination of unication
algorithms. Let < be a simplication ordering1 on ground terms assumed to be total and
such that the minimum for < is a name nmin and the constant in  are smaller than any
non-constant ground term. We dene 0 to be the set of the constant symbols of 1 and
2 plus the name nmin.
Given a possibly innite set of equations O we dene the ordered rewriting relation !O
by M !O M0 if and only if there exists an equation N1 = N2 2 O, a position p in M and a
substitution  such that:
M = M[N1]p; M0 = M[N2]p and N1 > N2:
It has been shown (see [14]) that by applying the unfailing completion procedure to a set
of equations E we can derive a (possibly innite) set of equations O such that on ground
terms:
1. the relations =O and =E are equal on T (),
2. the rewriting system !O is convergent on T ().
Applying unfailing completion to E = E1 [ E2, it is easy to notice [6] that the set of gener-
ated equations O is the disjoint union of the two systems O1 and O2 obtained by applying
unfailing completion procedures to E1 and to E2 respectively. The relation !O being con-
vergent on ground terms we can dene M#O (or shortly M#) as the unique normal form of
1By denition < satises that for all ground terms M;N1;N2 such that N1 < M[N1] and N1 < N2, we
have M[N1] < M[N2].
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the ground term M for !O. We denote by M#E1 (resp. M#E2) the unique normal form of
the ground term M for !O1 (resp. !O2).
We have the following lemmas which are classical results (see [10]).
Lemma 3 Let M be a non-constant ground term such that all its factors are in normal
form. Then
￿ either M# 2 0 [ Fct(M),
￿ or sign(M) = sign(M#) and Fct(M#)  0 [ Fct(M).
Looking more carefully at the proof of Lemma 3 given in [10], we easily deduce the
following lemma.
Lemma 4 Let M be a non-constant ground term such that sign(M) = i (i = 1;2) and all
its factors are in normal form. Then M# = M#Ei.
3.3 Normalization and replacements
If  is a set of positions in a term M, we denote by M[   N] the term obtained by
replacing any term at some position in  by N. We denote by N;N0 the replacement of
the occurrences of N which appears at a subterm position by N0. It is easy to establish the
following lemma (see [10]).
Lemma 5 Let M be a term such that its factors are in normal form. Let N 2 Fct(M) and
N0 be a term alien to M. We have that (MN;N0)# = ((M#)N;N0)#).
Example 5 Consider the equational theories Eenc and Exor.
Let M = dec(enc(hn1  n2;n1  n2  n3i;n1  n2);n1 n2), N = n1  n2 and N0 = n. We
have that
￿ MN;N0 = dec(enc(hn;n1  n2  n3i;n);n),
￿ M#N;N0 = hn;n1  n2  n3i.
Hence, we have that MN;N0# = M#N;N0#.
Let  : F ! ~ nF is a replacement (that is a function) from a nite set of terms F to
names ~ nF. Let F = ft1;:::;tkg such that whenever ti is a syntactic subterm of tj implies
i > j. For any term M, we denote by M the term obtained by replacing in M (in an order
that is consistent with the subterm relation) any subterm N that is equal to some N0 2 F
by (N0). Formally, M = (Mt1;(t1))tk;(tk). This extends in a natural way to set of
terms, substitutions, frames ...
Example 6 Consider the equational theories Eenc and Exor and the term t = dec(hn1 
hn1  n2;n3i;proj1(n1  n2)i;n1  n2). Let 2 be the replacement fn1  hn1  n2;n3i !
k1; n1  n2 ! k2g. t2 = dec(hk1;proj1(k2)i;k2).
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4 Combining algorithms for deduction
This section is devoted to the (sketch of) proof of the following theorem.
Theorem 1 Let (1;E1) and (2;E2) be two consistent equational theories such that 1 \
2 = ;. If deduction is decidable for (1;E1) and (2;E2) then deduction is decidable for
(1 [ 2;E1 [ E2).
Our algorithm consists in reducing the problem to decide whether  `E M (E = E1[E2)
to several deduction problems. Each of them will be solved either in the equational theory E1
or in the theory E2. Our procedure rst relies on the existence of a local proof of  ` M
which involves only terms in St(;M).
Lemma 6 (locality lemma) Let  = ~ n: be a frame and M be a ground term built on
 and in normal form. If  `E M then there exists a term  on  such that
￿ fn() \ ~ n = ; and  =E M,
￿ for all 0 2 St(), we have 0# 2 St(;M) [ 0.
Moreover, if sign(0) 6= sign(0#), we have 0# 2 St() [ 0.
Example 7 Consider again the equational theories Eenc and Exor, the frame  = n2;n3:fenc(hn1n2;n3i;n4)=x1g
and M = n2n3. We have that  ` M. The recipe  = proj1(dec(x1;n4))proj2(dec(x1;n4))
n1 satises the conditions given in Lemma 6.
We also need to decide deducibility in the theory E1 (resp. E2) for terms built on 1[2.
Therefore, we show that we can abstract the alien factors by new names.
Lemma 7 Let  be a frame and M be a ground term built on  and in normal form.
Let F2 = fN j N 2 St(;M) and sign(N) = 2g, ~ nF2 be a set of names, distinct from the
names occurring in  and M, of same cardinality as F2 and 2 : F2 ! ~ nF2 be a bijection.
We have that
 `E1 M if and only if ~ nF2:( `E1 M)2.
A similar result holds by inverting the indices 1 and 2.
We show the lemmas above (see Appendix) by using Lemmas 3, 4 and 5 stated in
Section 3. Then, we proceed by saturation of  by the subterms in St(;M) which are
deducible either in (1;E1) or in (2;E2).
Algorithm. Given a frame  and a term M, we saturate  as follows.
￿ We start with 0 =  [ 0.
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￿ For any term T 2 St(;M), if ~ nF2:(k `E1 T)2 or ~ nF1:(k `E2 T)1 where
F1;F2;1;2 are dened like in Lemma 7, we add T in the set of deducible subterms:
k+1 = k [ fTg.
We start over the procedure until there is no more T 2 St(;M) such that ~ nF2:(k `E1 M)2
or ~ nF1:(k `E1 M)1. Let  be the saturated set. Using Lemma 6, we can show that 
contains exactly the set of all deducible subterms of St(;M). We deduce that  `E1[E2 M
if and only if M 2 .
Example 8 Consider again Example 7, we successively add in the frame the terms n1n2,
n3 and n2  n3.
Complexity. Our reduction is polynomial. Our notion of size for terms was introduced for
proving our lemmas by induction. It does not correspond to the actual size of a term since our
notion of subterms does not take into account intermediate syntactic subterms. In addition,
complexity results for deduction and static equivalence are usually given as function of the
DAG-size of the terms. Thus we express the complexity of our procedure as function of the
DAG-size. The DAG-size of a term T, denoted tdag(t), is the number of distinct syntactic
subterms. We assume that  `Ei M can be decided in time fi(tdag() + tdag(M)) where
fi : N ! R, i 2 f1;2g. Saturating  requires at most jSt(;M)j  tdag()+tdag(M) steps. At
each step, we check whether ~ nF2:(k `E1 T)2 or ~ nF1:(k `E2 T)1 for each T 2 St(;M).
We deduce that  can be computed in time O((tdag()+tdag(M))2[f1(2(tdag()+tdag(M)))+
f2(2(tdag() +tdag(M)))]). In particular, if deciding `Ei can be done in polynomial time for
i 2 f1;2g then deciding `E1[E2 is also polynomial.
5 Combination algorithm for static equivalence
This section is devoted to the (sketch of) proof of the following theorem.
Theorem 2 Let (1;E1) and (2;E2) be two equational theories such that 1 \ 2 = ;. If
deduction and static equivalence are decidable for (1;E1) and (2;E2) then static equiva-
lence is decidable for (1 [ 2;E1 [ E2).
We more precisely show that whenever static equivalence is decidable for (1;E1) and (2;E2)
and deduction is decidable for (;E), then static equivalence is decidable for (;E) where
 = 1[2 and E = E1[E2. Thanks to our combination result for deduction (Theorem 1),
we know it is sucient for deduction to be decidable for (1;E1) and (2;E2). Note that the
decidability of `Ei is not necessarily a consequence of the decidability of Ei. The encoding
proposed in [3] works only when there exists a free function symbol in 1.
Our decision procedure works as follows. We rst add to the frames all their deducible
subterms. This is the reason why we require the decidability of `E. Then, we show that
to decide whether 1 j= EqE(2), it is sucient to check whether 1 j= EqE1(2) and
1 j= EqE2(2). Lastly, we abstract alien subterms by fresh names in order to reduce the
signature.
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5.1 Step 1: adding deducible subterms to the frames
Given 1 = ~ n:1 and 2 = ~ n:2 such that dom(1) = dom(2), we dene the frame 2
1
by extending 2 with deducible terms.
2
1 def = 2 [ f12#=x1;:::;n2# =xng
where i is a recipe of ti, i.e. i1# = ti and fn(i) \ ( ~ n1 [ ~ n2) such that:
￿ ti 2 St(1) [ 0, and
￿ ti is not in the image of 1, that is ti 6= x for any x 2 dom(1).
In particular, we have that 

=  [ ft1=x1;:::;tn =xng where ti are the deducible sub-
terms of . When 

= , we say that a frame  contains all its deducible subterms.
Example 9 Consider the frame  = n2;n3:fenc(hn1n2;n3i;n4)=x1g given in Example 7. We
have that


= n2;n3:f
enc(hn1n2;n3i;n4)=x1;
n1n2=x2;
n2=x3;
n3=x4;
n1=x5;
n4=x6;
0=x7g:
The following lemma ensures that extending frames preserves static equivalence.
Lemma 8 Let 1 and 2 be two frames such that dom(1) = dom(2). For any frame  
such that dom( ) = dom(1), we have that
2
 
j= EqE(1
 
) if and only if 2 j= EqE(1):
In particular, we deduce that 1 E 2 if and only if 1
2 E 2
2. Since 1
2 may not
contain all its deducible subterms, we need to extend again the frames with the deducible
subterms of 1
2. However, (2
2)
(1
2)
might not contains its deducible subterms anymore.
Lemma 9 states that actually, extending a frame preserves the property of containing all its
deducible subterms. The proof of this lemma relies on the locality lemma (Lemma 6) stated
in Section 4.
Lemma 9 Let  be a frame such that 

=  and   be any frame such that dom( ) =
dom(). Let 0 = 
 
. We have that 0 contains all its deducible subterms, i.e. 0
0
= 0.
Thanks to Lemma 8, we deduce that deciding whether 1 E 2 is thus equivalent to
deciding whether (1
2)
(1
2)
E (2
2)
(1
2)
where (1
2)
(1
2)
and (2
2)
(1
2)
contain
all their deducible subterms.
Computing 
 
. To compute 
 
, we not only need to compute that the set of deducible
subterms of   but for each deducible subterm T of  , we need to compute a recipe T such
that (T =E T) . Such a recipe can usually be deduced from the decision algorithm applied
to   `E T [2]. However, if it is not the case, once we know that   `E T (using the decision
algorithm), we can enumerate all the recipes until we nd  such that (T =E T) .
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5.2 Step 2: Checking for equalities in EqEi
Checking for  E   is equivalent to checking for  j= EqE( ) and   j= EqE(). We show
that checking for   j= EqE() can actually be done using only equalities in E1 and E2.
Proposition 1 Let  and   be two frames such that 

= . We have that   j= EqE() if
and only if   j= EqE1() and   j= EqE2().
It is straightforward that   j= EqE() implies   j= EqE1() and   j= EqE2(). The converse
is more dicult. We rst introduce some ordering on pair of terms. We have (M;N) <
(M0;N0) if
(max(jMj;jNj);jMj + jNj) <lex (max(jM0j;jN0j);jM0j + jN0j)
where <lex is the lexicographic order. Now, assuming that   j= EqE1() and   j= EqE2(), we
show by induction on the order on (M;N) that (M;N) 2 EqE() implies (M;N) 2 EqE( ).
The key lemma for the induction step is as follows.
Lemma 10 Let  be a frame such that 

=  and   be a frame such that   j= EqE1()
and   j= EqE2(). Let (M;N) 2 EqE() and assume that for all terms M0, N0 such that
(M0;N0) < (M;N), we have that
(M0 =E N0) ) (M0 =E N0) :
Let  = ~ n: such that (fn(M) [ fn(N)) \ ~ n = ;. If there exists  2 St(M) such
that sign() 6= sign(#), then there exists M1 such that jM1j < jMj, (M =E M1)
and (M =E M1) .
5.3 Step 3: Abstraction of alien subterms
Since   and  are built on  (and not on i), we cannot check whether   Ei  using
the decision algorithm for Ei. We show however that we can simply abstract the alien
subterms by fresh names.
Lemma 11 Let  and   be two frames built on  and in normal form. Let F2 = fN 2
St( [  ) j sign(N) = 2g, ~ nF2 be a set of names, distinct from the names occurring in 
and  , of same cardinality as F2 and 2 : F2 ! ~ nF a replacement. We have that
 j= EqE1( ) if and only if ~ nF2:2 j= EqE1(~ nF2: 2)
A similar result holds when inverting the indices 1 and 2.
5.4 Combination algorithm for static equivalence
To sum up, checking for 1 E 2 is performed in two steps:
1. Computing 0
1 = (1
2)
(1
2)
and 0
2 = (2
2)
(1
2)
.
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2. checking for ~ nF2:(0
1)2 E1 ~ nF2:(0
2)2 and ~ nF1:(0
1)1 E2 ~ nF1:(0
2)1.
Complexity. The complexity of the procedure mostly depends on the complexity of com-
puting 0
1 and 0
2 and on their size. In particular, it depends on the time for computing
recipes and on their size. Assume that
￿  `E M can be decided in f3(tdag() + tdag(M)),
￿ a recipe  such that ( =E M) can be computed in f4(tdag()+tdag(M)) and that we
control the size of the recipe tdag()  f5(tdag() + tdag(M))
￿  Ei   can be decided in fi(tdag() + tdag(M)) for i 2 f1;2g.
Then it is easy to check that  E   can be decided in time polynomial in the fi(tdag() +
tdag(M)) with i 2 f1;:::;5g. In particular, if the fi are polynomial, E is decidable in
polynomial time.
6 Application to new decidability results
Deduction and static equivalence are decidable in polynomial time (in the DAG-size of the
inputs) for any convergent subterm theory [2]. A convergent subterm theory is an equational
theory induced by a nite set of equations of the form u = v where v is a subterm of u or v is
a constant and such that the associate rewriting system is convergent. For example, Eenc is
a convergent subterm theory. From [4], we also know that deduction and static equivalence
are decidable in polynomial time for the equational theory Exor of the exclusive or. Applying
Theorems 1 and 2, we get the following new decidability result.
Proposition 2 Let E be a convergent subterm theory. Deduction and static equivalence are
decidable in polynomial time for E [ Exor.
Since deduction and static equivalence are also decidable for the theory of blind signature
and the theory of associativity [4], we get that deduction and static equivalence are decidable
for any combination of these theories.
As further work, we consider extending our combination result for non disjoint theories.
This would allow us to consider challenging theories like modular exponentiation or simply
Die-Hellman. We might use for example a notion of hierarchy between theories like in [11].
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A Proofs of Section 4
Lemma 6 (locality lemma) Let  = ~ n: be a frame and M be a ground term built on
 and in normal form. If  `E M then there exists a term  on  such that
￿ fn() \ ~ n = ; and  =E M,
￿ for all 0 2 St(), we have 0# 2 St(;M) [ 0.
Moreover, if sign(0) 6= sign(0#), we have 0# 2 St() [ 0.
Proof. By Lemma 1, we know that there exists a term built on  satisfying the rst condition.
We choose one, say that 0
M, whose size is minimal. Let M be the term obtained from 0
M
after replacing every occurrence of a name n 62 St(;M) by nmin. Since E is stable under
substitution of names, from the fact that 0
M =E M, we easily deduce that M =E M.
Now, we establish (by induction) that such a M satises the second condition.
Base case: M is a name, a variable or a term built over 1 (resp. 2) only. In such a case,
we easily conclude since St(M) = fMg.
Induction step: There exist 0;1;:::;` such that
￿  = 0[1;:::;`],
￿ 0 is built on i and in the remainder of the proof we assume w.l.o.g. that i = 1,
￿ 1;:::;` are built on  and sign(i) 6= 1.
By induction hypothesis, we know that for all i  `, for all 0 2 St(i), we have 0# 2
St(;i#) [ 0. To conclude that 0# 2 St(;M) [ 0 for any 0 2 St(), it is sucient
to show that for all i  ` we have i# 2 St(;M) [ 0.
￿ If sign(i) = ?, then we have i# 2 St() [ 0.
￿ If sign(i) = 2 and sign(i#) 6= 2, then we conclude that i# 2 St() [ 0 thanks
to the induction hypothesis.
￿ Now, we assume that sign(i) = 2 and sign(i#) = 2. We distinguish several cases.
1. i# 2 St(M) [ 0. In such a case, we easily conclude.
2. i# 2 St(j#) for some j such that sign(j#) = 1. By induction hypothesis,
since sign(j) = 2 6= sign(j#), we have j# 2 St() [ 0. Thus i# 2
St() [ 0.
3. Otherwise, we show that we can build a recipe 0
M of M smaller than M. Let
 = fj 2 f1;:::;`g j j# = i#g. Note that  6= ; since i 2 . Let
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0
M = 0[0
1;:::;0
`] where 0
j is equal to nmin if j 2  and to j otherwise. Note
that j0
Mj < jMj. Lastly, we have that 0
M is a recipe of M. Indeed
0
M# = 0[0
1#;:::;0
`#]#
= ((0[1#;:::;`#])(i)#;nmin)# since i# = 2 St(j#) for j = 2 
= ((0[1#;:::;`#])#(i)#;nmin)# thanks to Lemma 5
= M(i)#;nmin# = M since i 62 St(M)
Moreover, assume sign(M) 6= sign(M#). Since we have that sign(M) = sign(0[0
1#;:::;0
`#])
and 0[0
1#;:::;0
`#]# = M# then applying Lemma 3, we get M# 2 0[Fct(0[0
1#;:::;0
`#]).
For each 1  i  `, if sign(i) 6= sign(i#), we have seen that i# 2 St()[0. We deduce
that M# 2 0 [ St() [ f1#;:::;`#g. By minimality of M, there exists no i such
that M# = i#. This allows us to conclude. 
Lemma 7 Let  be a frame and M be a ground term built on  and in normal form.
Let F2 = fN j N 2 St(;M) and sign(N) = 2g, ~ nF2 be a set of names, distinct from the
names occurring in  and M, of same cardinality as F2 and 2 : F2 ! ~ nF2 be a bijection.
We have that
 `E1 M if and only if ~ nF2:( `E1 M)2.
Proof. ()) Let  = ~ n:. By Lemma 1, we know that there exists a term  on 1 such that
fn() \ ~ n = ; and  =E1 M. Hence, we know that # = M. We have to show that there
exists a term 0 on 1 such that fn(0)\(~ n[ ~ nF2) = ; and 02 =E1 M2. W.l.o.g. we can
assume that fn() \ ~ nF2 = ;. Let us show that the term  satises the required conditions.
Either sign(M2) = ? or sign(M2) = 1. In this last case, since M is in normal form,
applying Lemma 4, we get M2# = M2#E1. In both cases, we get
M
2# =E1 M
2 (1)
Since sign(()2) 6= 2 and ()2 does not contain subterms of sign 2 anymore, all its
factor are in normal form thus we can apply again Lemma 4, yielding to ()2# = ()2#E1.
We deduce
()2# =E1 ()2 (2)
Since all the factors of  are in normal form, we can apply Lemma 5
()
2# = ()#
2# (3)
By equality (3) and the fact that ()# = M, we get ()2# = M2#. Using equalities (1)
and (2), we deduce that ()2 =E1 M2. Now, since  is a term built on 1, we have that
()2 = (2) (syntactically). This allows us to conclude.
(() By Lemma 1, we know that there exists a term  on 1 such that fn()\(~ n[~ nF2) = ; and
2 =E1 M2. We show that fn() \ ~ n = ; (obvious) and  =E1 M. Since 2 =E1 M2
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and since E1 is closed under substitution of names, we deduce that (2)
 1
2 =E1 (M2)
 1
2 .
We have (M2)
 1
2 = M and (2)
 1
2 = ((2)

 1
2 ) =  since ~ nF2 62 fn(). This allows
us to conclude that  =E1 M. 
We prove the following claim, that shows the correction of the saturation algorithm.
Claim:  contains exactly the set d(St(;M)) of all deducible subterms of St(;M).
  d(St(;M)). We show by induction on k that k  d(St(;M)). The base case
0  d(St(;M)) is obvious. Assume now that for every U 2 k, U is deducible, that is
 `E1[E2 U. We have k+1 = k [fTg with T 2 St(;M) such that (w.l.o.g.) ~ nF2:(k `E1
T)2. Applying Lemma 7 we get that k `E1 T thus  `E1[E2 T and k+1  d(St(;M)).
d(St(;M))  . Let T 2 St(;M) be some deducible term, that is  `E1[E2 T. Lemma 6
ensures that there exists  such that fn() \ ~ n = ;, ()# = T and for all 0 2 St(), we
have 0# 2 St(;M) [ 0. We show by induction on jj that T 2 .
Base case. If jj  1 then either  is a name or a variable and we easily conclude, or  is
built on 1 or 2. We assume w.l.o.g. that  is built on 1. From Lemma 4 ()# = T
implies that ()#E1 = T thus  `E1 T. Applying Lemma 7, we get that ~ nF2:( `E1 T)2
thus T 2 .
Induction step. Assume  = 0[1;:::;k]. We have i# 2 St(;M) [ 0 for 1  i  k.
Since jij  jj, applying the induction hypothesis, we deduce that i# 2 . W.l.o.g.
we assume that sign(0) = 1. Thus  `E1 # = T. Applying Lemma 7, we get that
~ nF2:( `E1 T)2 thus T 2 . 
B Proofs of Section 5
B.1 Adding deducible subterms
Lemma 8 Let 1 and 2 be two frames such that dom(1) = dom(2). For any frame  
such that dom( ) = dom(1), we have that
2
 
j= EqE(1
 
) if and only if 2 j= EqE(1):
Proof. ()) Assume that 2
 
j= EqE(1
 
) and consider (M;N) 2 EqE(1). As (1
 
)jdom(1) =
1 and (2
 
)jdom(1) = 2, it follows that (M =E N)1
 
, thus (M =E N)2
 
, that is
(M =E N)2.
(() Conversely, assume that 2 j= EqE(1) and consider (M;N) 2 EqE(1
 
). Let 1 =
~ n1:1 and 2 = ~ n2:2 such that (fn(M) [ fn(N)) \ (~ n1 [ ~ n2) = ;. We have that 1
 
=
1[ft1=x1;:::;tn =xng with i1# = ti. Let M0 = M and N0 = N where  = f1=x1;:::;n =xng.
Since we have that i1 =E xi1
 , we deduce that M01 =E M1
  and N01 =E N1
 ,
that is (M0 =E N0)1. Since 2 j= EqE(1), we have (M0 =E N0)2. As we also have that
M02 =E M2
  and N02 =E N2
  (since i2 =E xi2
 ), we conclude that (M =E N)2
 
.

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Lemma 9 Let  be a frame such that 

=  and   be any frame such that dom( ) =
dom(). Let 0 = 
 
. We have that 0 contains all its deducible subterms, i.e. 0
0
= 0.
Proof. Let  = ~ n: and   = ~ n:0 for some sequence of names ~ n and some substitutions 
and 0. By construction, we have that 0 = [f1#=x1;:::;n# =xng where i are such that
i0# 2 St( ). We assume w.l.o.g. that for every i, we have that i satises the hypothesis of
the Lemma 6 (locality lemma), i.e. for all 0 2 St(i), we have that 00# 2 St( ). Moreover,
we also assume that terms have been introduced in the frame obeying the following ordering
condition: Let i and j be two terms such that i0# 2 St( ) and j0# 2 St( ). If
i 2 St(j) then i < j. Now, to conclude, it remains to show that for every i (1  i  n) we
have
St(i#)  St() [ f1#=x1;:::;i# =xig: (?)
Let i0 be the rst indice for which condition (?) is violated. Hence, there exists M such that
M 2 St(i0#) and M 62 St() [ f1#=x1;:::;i0# =xi0g. We have that i0 = 0[1;:::;`]
where 1;:::;` are the factors of i. By construction, we know that condition (?) is satised
for 1;:::;`. Hence, we have that St(j#)  St()[f1#=x1;:::;i0# =xi0g for any j such
that 1  j  `.
We consider the term 0[1#;:::;`#] and we have that its factors are in normal form.
We can apply Lemma 3. Hence, we are in one of the two cases described below:
1. i0# 2 0 [ Fct(0[1#;:::;`#])  St() [ St(f1#;:::;`#g).
2. Fct(i0#)  0 [ Fct(0[1#;:::;`#])  St() [ St(f1#;:::;`#g).
In both cases, we obtain a contradiction with the fact that i0 is the rst indice for which
condition (?) is violated. 
B.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Lemma 10 Let  be a frame such that 

=  and   be a frame such that   j= EqE1()
and   j= EqE2(). Let (M;N) 2 EqE() and assume that for all terms M0, N0 such that
(M0;N0) < (M;N), we have that
(M0 =E N0) ) (M0 =E N0) :
Let  = ~ n: such that (fn(M) [ fn(N)) \ ~ n = ;. If there exists  2 St(M) such
that sign() 6= sign(#), then there exists M1 such that jM1j < jMj, (M =E M1)
and (M =E M1) .
Proof. Let (M;N) 2 EqE() and  = ~ n: such that (fn(M) [ fn(N)) \ ~ n = ;. W.l.o.g. we
assume jMj  jNj. We prove this result by induction on jMj. Note that when jMj = 0, i.e.
M is a variable or a nonce, the result is obvious since (M;N) 2 EqE1() or (M;N) 2 EqE2().
Now, we know that that there exists 0;1;:::;` such that:
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￿ M = 0[1;:::;`],
￿ 0 is built on i and in the remainder of the proof we assume w.l.o.g. that i = 1.
Moreover, we know that 0 is not reduced to a variable or a name.
￿ 1;:::;` are built on  and sign(i) 6= 1.
We distinguish three cases.
First case: There exists i (1  i  `) and 0 2 St(i) such that sign(0) 6= sign(0#).
By induction hypothesis we know that there exists 0
i such that j0
ij < jij, (0
i =E i) and
(0
i =E i) . Let M1 = 0[1;:::;0
i;:::;`]. We have that jM1j < jMj, (M1 =E M) and
(M1 =E M) .
Second case: There exists i such that sign(i) = 2 and i# 2 St(). This means that
i# is a deducible subterm. Thus there exists x 2 dom() such that (x =E i). Since
(i;x) < (M;N), we deduce that (i =E x) . Let M0 = 0[1;:::;x;:::;`]. We have that
jM0j < jMj, (M =E M0) and (M =E M0) .
Third case: We know that sign(i) = sign(i#) for every i such that 1  i  `. Moreover,
if sign(i) 6= ?, we have that i# 62 St(). In addition, since by hypothesis there exists  2
St(M) such that sign() 6= sign(#), we must have  = M thus sign(M) 6= sign(M#).
Now, either (Case (a)) there is no i such that sign(i) = 2 meaning that M has all
its factor in normal form, thus applying Lemma 3, we have M# 2 St() [ 0  St() since


= .
￿ Either there exists x 2 dom() such that (M =E x). Thanks to Lemma 4, we deduce
that (M =E1 x) and hence we have that (M;x) 2 EqE1(). Since   2 EqE1(), we
have also (M =E1 x) , thus (M =E x) . Let M1 = x, we easily conclude.
￿ Or there exists n 2 N, such that M# = n. Thanks to Lemma 4, we have that
(M =E1 n). Since   j= EqE1(), we deduce that (M =E1 n)  and hence (M =E n) .
Let M1 = n, we easily conclude.
Otherwise (Case (b)), let  = fi# j sign(i) = 2 and 1  i  `g. Let t1;:::;tk be the
elements of  ordered in such a way that if ti is a syntactic subterm of tj then j < i. Let
n1;:::;nk be some new nonces that do not appear in  nor  . Let i = ti;ni for every i
such that 1  i  k.
By applying successively Lemma 5, we obtain
((
0[1#;:::;`#]1):::k)# = (((M#)1#):::)k# (4)
Let M0 = 0[0
1;:::;0
`] where 0
i = i if i# 62  and 0
i = nj if i# = tj. We
have that ((0[1#;:::;`#]1):::k) = 0[0
1#;:::;0
`#] =E M0. In addition, since
sign(0[1#;:::;`#]) 6= sign(M#) and 0[1#;:::;`#] has all its factors in normal
form, applying Lemma 3, we get M# 2  [ St() (note that 0  St()). From the
equality (4) we can deduce that
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￿ either M# = tj for some tj (1  j  k) and we have (M0 =E nj),
￿ or M# 2 St() and in such a case, we know that there exists x 2 dom() such that
M# = x. Hence we have that (M0 =E x).
In both case, we have obtain an equality in EqE1() and thanks to the fact that   j=
EqE1(), we deduce that either (M0 =E1 nj)  (Case 1) or (M0 =E1 x)  (Case 2). For every
i such that 1  i  k, let i = fj j j# = ti and 1  j  `g and let i 2 i. We denote
by 0 the following replacement:
0 = fn1 7! 10#;:::;nk 7! k0#g:
Claim: For every i such that 1  i  `, we have that (0
i0#)0 = i0#.
Indeed either 0
i = i and we easily conclude. Otherwise we have that 0
i = np for some p
such that 1  p  k and we know that (i =E p). By induction hypothesis, we deduce
that (i =E p) . Hence, we have that (0
i0#)0 = (np0#)0 = p0# = i0#.
(Case 1) We have that (M =E j). Note also that jjj < jMj. Hence, it remains to show
that (M =E j) . We have shown that (M0 =E1 nj) , this means that 0[0
10#;:::;0
`0#] =E
nj. Since E is closed under substitution of names, we have that 0[(0
10#)0;:::;(0
10#)0] =E
j0#. Using our claim, we obtain that 0[10#;:::;`0#] =E j0#. Hence, we deduce that
(M =E j) .
(Case 2) We have that (M =E x). Since jxj < jMj, it remains to show that (M =E x) .
We have shown that (M0 =E1 x) , this means that 0[0
10#;:::;0
`0#] =E x0. Since E
is closed under substitution of names, we have that 0[(0
10#)0;:::;(0
10#)0] =E x0#.
By using our claim, we obtain that 0[10#;:::;`0#] =E x0#. Hence, we easily deduce
that (M =E x) . 
Proposition 1 Let  and   be two frames such that 

= . We have that   j= EqE() if
and only if   j= EqE1() and   j= EqE2().
Proof. ()) Since EqE1()  EqE() and EqE2()  EqE() and thanks to Lemma 4 we have
that   j= EqE() implies   j= EqEi() for i 2 f1;2g.
(() Conversely, let   = ~ n:0 be a frame such that   j= EqE1() and   j= EqE2(). Let
(M;N) 2 EqE() and  = ~ n: for some substitution . We prove, by induction on the size
of (M;N), that (M =E N) . We assume w.l.o.g. that M is such that jMj  jNj.
Base case: jMj+jNj  1. This means that M and N are variables, names or terms built only
on 1 or 2 and only M can satisfy sign(M) 6= ?. In such a case, either (M;N) 2 EqE1()
or (M;N) 2 EqE2() and we conclude by applying our hypothesis.
Induction step: We know that jMj  1. This means that there exist 0
M;1
M;:::;`
M such
that
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￿ M = 0
M[1
M;:::;`
M],
￿ 0
M is built on i and in the remainder of the proof we will assume w.l.o.g. that i = 1,
￿ 1
M;:::;`
M are built on  and sign(i
M) 6= 1 for i 2 f1;:::;`g.
and we know also that there exist 0
N;1
N;:::;
p
N such that
￿ N = 0
N[1
N;:::;
p
N],
￿ 0
N is built on i and in the remainder of the proof we will assume that sign(0
N) 6= 2
since if sign(M) 6= sign(N) we easily conclude, thanks to Lemma 10, by noticing
that either sign(M) 6= sign(M#) or sign(N) 6= sign(N#).
￿ 1
N;:::;
p
N are built on  and sign(i
N) 6= 1 for i 2 f1;:::;pg.
Note that the sets f1
M;:::;`
Mg and f1
N;:::;
p
Ng might be empty.
We distinguish several cases.
Case 1: If there exists i
M (or i
N) such that sign(i
M) 6= sign(i
M#). In such a case,
we can apply Lemma 10 on i
M. We deduce that there exists U such that jUj < ji
Mj,
(U =E i
M) and (U =E i
M) . Let M0 = 0
M[1
M;:::;U;:::;`
M]. We have that (M =E M0)
and (M =E M0) . Applying our induction hypothesis on (M0;N), we obtain (M0 =E N) .
Thus we deduce that (M =E N) .
Case 2: If there exists i
M (or i
N) such that sign(i
M) = 2 and i
M# 2 St(). This means
that i
M# is a deducible subterm. Thus there exists x 2 dom() such that (i
M =E x).
Let M0 = 0
M[1
M;:::;x;:::;`
M]. We have that (M =E M0) and (M =E M0) . Now, we
apply our induction hypothesis on (M0;N). We obtain that (M0 =E N)  and we deduce
that (M =E N) .
Case 3: We have that sign(i
M) = sign(i
M#) for every i such that 1  i  ` and also that
sign(i
N) = sign(i
N#) for every i such that 1  i  p. Moreover, if sign(i
M) 6= ? (resp.
sign(i
N) 6= ?), we have that i
M# 62 St() (resp. i
N# 62 St()).
Consider among the i
M, 
j
N such that sign(i
M) = 2, sign(
j
N) = 2, one such that
i
M#, 
j
N# is maximal w.r.t. the syntactic subterm ordering. Note that if such a i
M (or

j
N) does not exist then we have that (M;N) 2 EqE1() and we conclude using the fact that
  j= EqE1(). In that case, we obtain (M =E1 N)  thus (M =E N) . So, let X be such a
term.
Let  = f 2 f1
M;:::;`
M;1
N;:::;
p
Ng j # = X#g and n be a new name. Let
M0 = 0
M[01
M;:::;0`
M] and N0 = 0
N[01
N;:::;
0p
N] where
￿ 0i
M is equal to n if i
M 2  and to i
M otherwise, and
￿ 0i
N is equal to n if i
N 2  and to i
N otherwise.
Let  = X#;n. Since M# = N#, we have (M#)# = (N#)#. Moreover, thanks to
Lemma 5, we have also that
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￿ (0
M[1
M#;:::;`
M#])# = (M#)#, i.e. M0# = (M#)#,
￿ (0
N[1
N#;:::;
p
N#])# = (N#)#, i.e. N0# = (N#)#.
Hence, we have that (M0;N0) 2 EqE(). Since (M0;N0) < (M;N), by induction hypothesis,
we obtain (M0 =E N0) .
Let 0 = n;X0#.
Claim: For every i such that 1  i  ` (resp. 1  i  p), we have that (0i
M0#)0 = i
M0#
(resp. (0i
N0#)0 = i
N0#).
Indeed either 0i
M = i
M and we easily conclude. Otherwise we have that 0i
M = n and we
know that (i
M =E X). By induction hypothesis (since (i
M;X) < (M;N)), we deduce
that (i
M =E X) . Hence we have (0i
M0#)0 = X0# = i
M0#.
We have shown that (M0 =E N0) . Hence we have that
0
M[01
M0#;:::;0`
M0#] =E 0
N[01
N0#;:::;
0p
N0#]:
Since E is closed under substitution of names, we deduce that
0
M[(01
M0#)0;:::;(0`
M0#)0] =E 0
N[(01
N0#)0;:::;(
0p
N0#)0]:
By using our claim, we obtain that
0
M[1
M0#;:::;`
M0#] =E 0
N[1
N0#;:::;
p
N0#]:
Hence we deduce that (M =E N) . 
B.3 Abstracting alien subterms
Lemma 11 Let  and   be two frames built on  and in normal form. Let F2 = fN 2
St( [  ) j sign(N) = 2g, ~ nF2 be a set of names, distinct from the names occurring in 
and  , of same cardinality as F2 and 2 : F2 ! ~ nF a replacement. We have that
 j= EqE1( ) if and only if ~ nF2:2 j= EqE1(~ nF2: 2)
Proof. ()) Let (M;N) 2 EqE1(~ nF: 2). We have to show (M =E1 N)2. Since (M =E1
N) 2 and since E1 is closed under substitution of names, we deduce that ((M =E1 N) 2)2
 1
.
Moreover, we have that
￿ (M 2)2
 1
= M( 2)2
 1
= M  since ~ nF 62 fn(M), and
￿ (N 2)2
 1
= N( 2)2
 1
= N  since ~ nF 62 fn(N).
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This allows us to obtain that (M =E1 N) . Now, thanks to the fact that  j= EqE1( ), we
deduce that (M =E1 N). Let  = ~ n:. We have that M# = N#. Since sign((M)2) 6=
2 and (M)2 does not contain subterms of sign 2, all its factors are in normal form.
Thus, we can apply Lemma 4, yielding to (M)2# = (M)2#E1. We deduce that
(M)2# =E1 (M)2 (5)
In the same way, we can obtain (N)2# =E1 (N)2.
Since all the factors of M and N are in normal form, we can apply Lemma 5 , yielding
to
(M)
2# = (M)#
2# (N)
2# = (N)#
2# (6)
By the equalities (6) and the fact that M# = N#, we obtain that (M)2# =
(N)#2# = (N)2#. Now, using equalities (5), we obtain that (M)2 =E1 (N)2. Now,
since M and N are terms built on 1, we have that (M)2 = M(2) and (N)2 = N(2)
(syntactically). This allows us to conclude.
(() Let (M;N) 2 EqE1( ). We have to show that (M =E1 N). Firstly, we can assume
w.l.o.g. that (fn(M) [ fn(N)) \ ~ nF = ;. Let   = ~ n:.
Since sign((M)2) 6= 2 and (M)2 does not contain subterms of sign 2, all its factors
are in normal form. Thus, we can apply Lemma 4, yielding to (M)2# = (M)2#E1. We
deduce that
(M)2# =E1 (M)2 (7)
In the same way, we obtain (N)2# =E1 (N)2.
Since all the factors of M and N are in normal form, we can apply Lemma 5 , yielding
to
(M)
2# = (M)#
2# (N)
2# = (N)#
2# (8)
By the equalities (8) and the fact that M# = N#, we obtain that (M)2# =
(N)#2# = (N)2#. Now, using equalities (7), we obtain that (M)2 =E1 (N)2. Now,
since M and N are terms built on 1, we have that (M)2 = M(2) and (N)2 = N(2)
(syntactically). Hence, we obtain that (M =E1 N) 2. Since ~ nF:2 j= EqE1(~ nF: 2), we
deduce that (M =E1 N)2. Since E1 is closed under substitution of names, we deduce that
((M =E1 N)2)2
 1
. We have (M2)2
 1
= M(2)2
 1
= M since ~ nF \ fn(M) = ;.
For the same reason, we have that (N2)2
 1
= N. This allows us to conclude. 
B.4 Complexity
Let 1 and 2 be two frames. Let 0
1 = (1
2)
(1
2)
and 0
2 = (2
2)
(1
2)
.
Assume that
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￿  `E M can be decided in f3(tdag() + tdag(M)),
￿ a recipe  such that ( =E M) can be computed in f4(tdag()+tdag(M)) and that we
control the size of the recipe tdag()  f5(tdag() + tdag(M))
￿  Ei   can be decided in fi(tdag() + tdag(M)) for i 2 f1;2g.
We also assume that the fi are non-decreasing functions.
Let h : N ! N such that h(x) = x(f3(2x) + f4(2x)). Let g : N  N ! N such that
g(x;y) = x(f5(2y) + x).
Claim 1 Let  be a frame. 

can be computed in time tdag()f3(2tdag()). Moreover,
tdag(

)  tdag().
Computing 

is equivalent to computing the deducible subterms of . That is, for each
M in St(), we check whether  `E M, which can be performed in f3(tdag() + tdag(M)) 
f3(2tdag()). Thus 

can be computed in time tdag()f3(2tdag()). Moreover, since only
subterms of  are added in 

, the DAG-size does not change thus tdag(

)  tdag(). 
Claim 2 Let  and   be two frames. 
 
can be computed in time h(tdag( )). Moreover,
tdag(
 
)  g(tdag();tdag( )).
To compute 
 
we have to check, for each M in St( ) whether   `E M, which can be
performed in f3(tdag( )+tdag(M))  f3(2tdag( )). Whenever   `E M, we have to compute
a recipe for M, which can be done in f4(tdag( ) + tdag(M))  f4(2tdag( )). Altogether
we deduce that 
 
can be computed in time h(tdag( )). Moreover, tdag(
 
)  tdag() +
j j(f5(tdag( )) + tdag())  g(tdag();tdag( )). 
We deduce that 1
2 can be computed in time h(tdag(2)) and 0
1 can be computed in
time h(tdag(2)) + tdag(1
2)f3(2tdag(1
2)) that is 0
1 can be computed in time at most
h(tdag(2)) + g(tdag(1);tdag(2))f3(2g(tdag(1);tdag(2))) (9)
Moreover tdag(0
1)  tdag(1
2)g(tdag(1);tdag(2)).
Similarly, 2
2 can be computed in time tdag(2)f3(2tdag(2)). Thus 0
2 can be computed
in time tdag(2)f3(2tdag(2)) + h(tdag(1
2)) that is 0
2 can be computed in time at most
tdag(2)f3(2tdag(2)) + h(g(tdag(1);tdag(2))) (10)
Moreover tdag(0
2)  g(tdag(2);g(tdag(1);tdag(2))).
Since abstracting alien subterms make the size decrease, we get that checking whether
~ nF2:(0
1)2 E1 ~ nF2:(0
2)2 can be computed in time at most
f1(g(tdag(1);tdag(2)) + g(tdag(2);g(tdag(1);tdag(2)))) (11)
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and whether ~ nF1:(0
1)1 E2 ~ nF1:(0
2)1 can be computed in time at most
f2(g(tdag(1);tdag(2)) + g(tdag(2);g(tdag(1);tdag(2)))) (12)
Altogether, the complexity of checking whether 1 E 2 is obtained by summing the
four values (9) +(10) + (11) +(12).
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